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ComrrumlarylOaks[ord & Chatcr: Pn~ds ()[ Baycsirm RflliorwZUy 
principle. that P(qlp) remains the same when com[mted on an 
enlarged space. '1'his is the only way in which one can gllarantee 
that enlargements of the prohahility space in the limit lead to a 
coherent prohahility distrilmtion - the starting point of Bayesian 
rationality. 
(2) An'nrthodox Bayesian alternative wOllld he a constmction 
in which the prohahiÍity spaces remain the same (namely. the 
ILIliversal space hased on all possihle propositions). Imt the proh-
ahility distrilmtions change. In ollr toy world. the prohahility 
space is in hoth cases {p, q, r}. hllt one COI lid aSSllme that the 
probabílily distribution Hrst assigns probabílity O to nol-r. anrl. 
Ilpon hecoming aware of the seconrl conrlitional "if r then q," a 
nonzero prohahility. '1'he trollhle with sllch a sllggestion is that 
from a Bayesian point of view. the transition from the a priori 
prohahility P(nol-r)=O to the a posteriori P(llol-r) > O is not 
allowerL hecallse this cannot he achieverl \'la CBaCo): conrlitiona-
lizing on more e\'lrlence cannot make a nllll prohahility positive. 
One tlllls neerls an arlrlitional rationality principie (heyonrl 
[BaCo]) governing sllch transitions. In the ahsence of sllch a 
principie. one has to assllme that the prohahilities of all non-
salient exceptions (SlLch as nol-r) are initially very small Imt 
nonzero. '1'his increases the complttational complexity of proh-
ahílistic reasoning enormollsly: One rerjlures massh'e storage 
anrl intricate complltations to maintain consistency of the proh-
ahílity assignment. 
'1'hese consirlerations show that in orrler to accollnt for the rlata 
on the sllppression task any prohahilistic morlel needs to he Sllp-
plementerl with a theory ahollt nonmonotonic and non-Bayesian. 
Imt stíll somehow rational. changes in rlegrees ofhelief One may 
then qllestion whether a prohahilistic morlel is necessaryat all: 
Stenning amI mn Lamhalgen (2005: 2008a) pro\"lrle a morld 
cast entirely in terms of nonmonotonic logic. 
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Abstraet: Oaksfon[ & Chatpf (O&C) focm on pattprns oftypicaJ at!llJt 
rpasoning from a prohahilistic pprsppctivP. \Vp discllsS implications of 
pxtpnding tJ¡P prohahiJistic approach to Jifpspan t!p\P]opmpnt, 
considpring thp rolp 01' \Vorking mpmory, stratpgy llSP, and pxpPrtisP. 
Exphtining nuiations in 1111111an reasoning posPs a challengP tú Bayp.sian 
ration~J analysis j as it fpqllirps intpgrating knowlpdgp ahollt cognitivp 
processps. 
Bayesian rationality highlights the remarkahle sllccesses rather 
than faillll"es of hllman reasoning hy recasting seemingly erro-
neolls reasoning in logical tasks Ilsing a prohahilistic approach. 
However, in their hook Bay{,,~ian Ralionalily (Oaksforrl & 
Chater 2007, henceforth BR). Oaksford & Chater (0&(;) rlraw 
a rather static pictlll'e of hllman reasoning hy focllsing on 
typical patterns of responses from arllllts. \Ve propose a more 
rlynamic perspeetive, whieh eonsiders that reasoning systemati-
eally varies within inrlividllals over the lifespan (Howe & Rahino-
wltz 1996; Markovits & BalTOIullet 2002) and hetween 
inrllvidllals with rllflúent levds of knowledge and expertise 
(Ericsson et al. 2006). Althollgh O&C acknowledge the impOlt-
ance of co nsidering reaso ni ng data on inrll vid I tal diflúe nces 
(BR, p. 288) and on information proeessing eapaeities (p. 290), 
do not ackquate1y 8ceount for how variat.ion inBuences a 
Bayesian rational analysis of reasoning. Anderson (l991a) and 
others have pointed Ollt that perhaps the major potentiallinüt-
ation. the "Adülles heel," of rational analysis wOllld he eoml)l[-
tational constraints that are too complex or arhitrary. \Ve arglle 
that Olll' 'ltlrlerstanrling ofthe meehanisms of ehange in reasoning 
ean hdp IlS specify comp'ltational limitations for prohahilistie 
modeling and assess whether a single model ean captlll'e the 
complexities of reasoning. 
'vtany impOltant aspects of eognition change over the lif'espan. 
amI reasoning is no exeeption (Baltes et al. 1999). Aecorrling 
to Piaget, hoth logieal reasoning and prohahilistic reasoning 
emerge fl-om adoleseenee to yOllng adlllthood at the lüghest 
stage of coglütive development (Piaget & Inhelder 1975). 
Subsequent resf,awh, howevm', has qualified these Hndings, 
showing that yOllnger düldre n Iltldersta nd as pects of s Ilch rmson-
ing (Falk & Wilke,üng 1998: Galotti et al. 1997). Flllthermore. 
reasoning contülIles to de\'elop rllll'ing arllllthood with perform-
:Hlce in spedfic domaíns írwreasing as individuals gain reasoning 
knowledge and expeltise (Eriesson & Lehmann 1996: Sternherg 
1999). Yet, overall aeross the adlllt lifespan. ahstraet reasolüng 
(measllred hy intelligenee tests) dedines with age (Verhaeghen 
& SalthOllse 1997). '1'lllls. rmsoning is a rlynamic aspeet of coglü-
tion that varies with age and experience and res IIltS from the inter-
play of hiologieal proeesses (e.g., hrain matlll'ation) and 
enellltlll'ation (e.g .. edlleation) (Baltes et al. 1999). 
A developmental perspective may inform Bayesian rational 
analysis hy specif~'ing comp'ltationallinütations of the coglütive 
system. An impOltant limitation faced hy the 11llman eogniti\'e 
system is working memOly capaeity - a key rleterminant of 
reasoning performanee (Kyllonen & Christal 1990). Like other 
coglütive eapacities. working memory systematically ehanges 
aeross the lif'espan hy steadily inereasing dlll'ing childhood 
(Conlin et al. 2005) and declilüng aeross adlllthood (Verhaeghen 
& Salthollse 1997). \Vorking memory. therefore, poses a dynamie 
eonstraint on the rational analysis of reasOlüng. 
Althollgh O&C are clllTently silent on the role of de\'elopmen-
tal changes in working memory amI reasoning. they do note that 
inrllvidllals with lügher working memory capaeities tend to 
exlühit more logieal reasOlüng. '1'0 illllstrate. in the \Vason selec-
tion task. a SIlhgrollp ofindi\'ldllals (ca. 10 'k ) consistently chooses 
the logieally eorreet comhination of carrls, inrlicating that 
althollgh most seem to adopt a prohahilistic model, others 
dearly do not. O&C sllggest that tlüs variation in hehavior pri-
marily rd10cts ddiueratíve strategy use and edneational (train-
ing) rllfl'erences. wlüeh are "not inrllcative of inrllvidllal 
rliflerences in the natlll'e of the fllndamental principies of 
hllman reasoning" (BR. p. 288). This daim seems prohlematie 
gh'en what we know ahollt the interplay hetween strategy Ilse. 
trailüng. anrI hasie coglütive mechanisms. Of eOlll'se. coglütive 
capaeities can eonstrain the strategies tllat people Ilse: 
ho\v,"ver, spel'ific strategy us," and training may shape the basic 
eognith'e meehanisms, as welL Diflerenees in memory strategies 
(e.g .. rehearsal, dlllnking) ean also alter hasic mechalüsms of 
working memory eapacity anrl its rdationship to eogniti\'e per-
formance (Cokdy et aL 2006). In adrlltion. hoth eJ\.-tensive prac-
tice with sp.::dHe strategies and the aequisition uf knowledge 
anrI expeltise dramatieally expand working memOly (Eriesson 
& Kintseh 1995). lndeed, as training ehanges ddiherative strat-
egies to alltomatie proeesses, the eOltex ean Ilndergo fllnctional 
nellroanatomieal reorganization (Diek et al. 2006). '1'Illls, it is 
possible that delibel'8:Uve scrategy use and training may influence 
reasoning preeisdy hecau,~e they alter Ilnderlying cognitive 
mechanisms sllch as wOl'king memory. Given the eomplex 
rdationship hetween strategies. training., and eognitive meehan-
isms, it seems prematlll'e to dismiss individllal diH'erenees in 
strategy Ilse as not flltldamental to reasoning. A eomprehensive 
modd of hllman reasoning nlllst aeeollllt for tllese difl'erenees. 
Variation in human reasoning has proven diffi.eu]t to eapture 
for prohahilistie modds (Sllllltz 2007)., althOllgh recent researeh 
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has made some progress applying prohahilistic models to individ-
Ilal diflprences (e.g .. category learning: :\lavarro et al. 2006) amI 
cognitive development (e.g .. callsalreasoning: Sohel et al. 2004). 
This work represents a step in the right direction: however. we 
expect that no single modd can prerlict reasoning performance 
eqllally well across age grollpS and le\'els of experience. 
1 ndeerl, system atic variations in peoples' h eh avi or s Ilggest that 
severa! diH(,rent models (or modifications of a given mode]) 
may he rerl'úred to explain rleveloping hehavior (SlllLltz 2007). 
:\levertheless, investigating diflúences hetween the models 
across age grollps and skill le\'els may help IlS to Ilnrlerstanrl 
more exactly '\vhat rliflers" hetween amI "what rle\'elops" 
witlün individllalS. 
In dosing, we mllst emphasize O&C's comment that prohahil-
istic morlels are often onlv flUlctionallevel tlleories that shollld 
not he confllserl with ' algoritlmüc le\·d theories (process 
modds). Brighton anrl Gigerenzer (2008) have pointerl Oltt in 
their rliscllssion of the linüts of Bayesian models of coglütion 
that the rJllestion ofwhythe lllLman nünd does what it does (fIUlC-
tionallevel) cannot he separated from the qllestion of how the 
hllman nünrl rloes it (algoritllnüc level). Therefore, it is cmcial 
that flltme Bayesian rational analyses specif~r how exactly their 
fIUlctionalle\'el morlds constrain theorizing ahOllt cogtütive pro-
cesses. Tlüs iSSlle is especially relevant as the data connecting 
rlevelopment, expertise, working memory, amI reasOlüng imply 
that m Illtiple strategies (anrl therefore p rocesses) are at play. 
Thollgh Bayesian rationality seems to provirle a flltlctionallevel 
accolUlt of prototYVical adlllt reasoning, tlle development of cog-
tüth'e capacities anrl expertise remains Ilnrlerappreciated. 
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Abstraet: The probabilistic approach to human reasoning i~ e'ú'mplif10d 
by t]¡P inl"nrlllatinn g,lin Illoclpl I"nr thp \Vasnn canl splpctinn task. 
Althnllgh thp Illndd is plpgant ami nrigiruJ, sP\pml kpy asppcts nI" t]¡P 
Illndf'l warrant tilrt]lPr (liscllssinn, particlllarly t]lOSf' cnncf'rning t]lf' 
scnpp nI" t]¡P task ami t]¡f' chnicp proCf'SS nI" indú"idmJs. 
In the hook Baljl'sian Ralimw/itlj (Oaksforrl & Chater 2007. hen-
cefortll BR)., Oaksford & Chater (O&C) present a sllmmary anrl a 
synthesis of tlleir work on hllman reasoning. The altthors arglle 
that formal logic anrl rlerlllC'tion rlo not explain how people 
reason in evervday situations. The deflciendes 01' the most 
simple forms of logic are ohviollS when one consirlers that they 
may assign "tl'lle" to ahsllrrl statements sllC'h as "if tlle moon is 
bhw, than eows eat flsh" (BR, p. 70). ~v1ore impOltantly, the 
alltllOrs propose that, in contrast to formallogic, prohahility cal-
cllllls rloes provirle the right tools for an analysis of llllman 
reasoning. TllllS, the allthors arglle that people solve rlerlllC'tive 
tasks hy inrlllC'tive methorls. From this perspeetive, llllman 
reasoning can he characterizerl as Bayesian 01' rational. 
Consirler tlle \Vason carrl sdection task rliscllsserl in Chapter 
6. Palticipants are confl'Onterl with fOllr carrls., showing an A., a 
K, a 2, anrI a í. Palticipants are tolrl that each carrI has a tlllmher 
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on one side and a letter on the other. They are given a mle, "if 
there is an A on one side. then tllere is a 2 on the otller side." 
amI sllhseel'lently. have to select tllOse cards tllat need to he 
tlll"ned over to assess whether tlle mle holds tme or noto A 
momenfs thO'lght reveals that the cards that need to he tlll"nerl 
m'er are the A can! and the 7 can!. Yet, tlle majority ofpalticipants 
rlo not choose tlle 7 can!. 1mt tend to choose the 2 canI instearl. 
O&C propose an elegant Bayesian model - tlle information 
gain model - to accolUlt for people's performance in the 
\Vason task. According to the morlel, people select the carrls 
lhal reduce tlleir eA-p ecled uncertainty fue most. 5peciHc 
assllmptions ahollt tlle rarity of tlle information on the carrls 
lead to the condllsion tllat selection of the 2 card nüght he 
rational after all. 
The information gain model has heen sllhjected to intense 
scmtiny (e.g., Oheraller et al. 1999). For non-expelts, the 
detalls of thís ruscussion are somewhat difHcwt to f611ow. 
A Ilsdlll g,úrleline is tllat a modd shollld only he ahanrloned 
when it can he replaced with sometlüng hetter. And - criticisms 
raised against tlle information gain model notwithstanding-
1 have not come across a model that does a hetter joh explaining 
how people make tlleir card selections. 
Despite its simplicity anrl elegance, some impOltant rletails of 
the information gain morlel were not dear to me. First. O&C 
arglle, on page 210, that their accollnt only holds if palticipants 
regard the cards as a sample from a larger poplllation. Perhaps 
the allthors cOllld spell Ollt tlüs argllment in a hit more detail. 
Taldng probabílit.y as a rdlection of degree of belief, J die!. not 
immerliatdy see what calclllations are in neerl of adjllstment. 
Seconrl, the allthors mention that palticipants who realize that 
the cards are nol samplerl from a larger pO[lIllation wOlllrl 
alwavs choose the A card and the 7 carel. 1 do not know 
vdwther thh predictíoll has becn testcd cmpirieally but 1 Hnd 
it unly slightly more plausible than eows eating Hsh. Note that 
in the \Vason task a SIlhstantial proportion of participants do 
not eve n s elect the A carr!. 
Another isslle that warrants doser exanünation is the way the 
model's preelictions relate to the data. In the information' gain 
modeL each card redllces the expected I LtlCeltaint y to some 
exient. \Vhy then does an individllal palticipant not select all 
fOil!" carrls, 1mt generally only selects one or two') In otller 
words, it was IltlClear to me how the morld, from a consideration 
of expecterlllnceltainty redllction, can prerlict canI selections for 
an individllal participant. 
A fOluth point concerns the role ofitlllividllal eliHúences. As the 
alltllOrs disCllSS on page 211, a SlLhgrollp of Ilndergrad'late stlldents 
witlllügh intelligence (ahollt 10%) rlo sdec1 the A canI anrl the 7 
carrl. This reslllt strengthened my initial helid tllat a motimter!. 
intelligent person wOllld always choose the A anrl 7 cards, when 
given snffieknt tirnf'. In the spiJit. of falsiHeation, 1 then tested 
this assllmption on a colleag'le, who of COILl"Se immediately 
seketed the A and 2 cards. h,rhaps Shf' was not sufficíently motiv-
ated to tlünk the prohlem thro'lgh careftJly - WOlUrl incentives of 
time or money increase the sdection of the 7 carrP 
O&C are t~ he arlnürerl for their principled approach to qllan-
titative morleling, anrl for tlleir cOlll"age to take on the Ilnassailahle 
rlogma of hll man irrationality. lt is Ilnfortllnate tllat nllLch of the 
material in the hook was alrearly availahle dsewhere (e.g .. , Oaks-
forrl & Chater 2001; 2003h); therdore, it was not entirdv clear 
to me what the hook arlrls to 0111" ClllTent knowlerlge hase. ' 
One linal eomment. It strikes me as paradoxical that research·· 
ers who arglle fOl" a coherent, rational approach to hllman reason-
ing then pl'Oceerl to apply an incoherent, irrational appl'Oach to 
the statistical analysis of their experi me ntal rlata. Thl'OllgllO Ilt 
the h ook, the allthors re nOI LIlce Popper' s stance o n tlle i m pOlt-
ance of falsilication, arguing that thís ís not how scienee works, 
nor how people reason. Bllt tllen, in the very same WOl"k, the 
alltllOrs measllre tlle valirlity of their morlds hy means of p-
vallles, anrl indllrle statements SIlC'h as "the morld COlurl not he 
rejecterl." Why'? 
